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Climate change is characterized by deep structural uncertainty in the science cou-
pled with an economic inability to evaluate meaningfully the welfare losses from high
temperature changes. The probability of a disastrous collapse of planetary welfare
from too much CO2 is non-negligible, even if this low probability is not objectively
knowable. This paper attempts to explain (in not excessively technical language) some
of the most basic issues in modeling the economics of catastrophic climate change.
The paper builds to a tentative conclusion that, no matter what else is done realis-
tically to slow CO2 buildups, economic analysis lends some support to undertaking
serious research now into the prospects of fast geoengineering preparednessas a
state-contingent emergency option o¤ering at least the possibility of knocking down
catastrophic temperatures rapidly.
1 Introduction
Four big questions often asked about climate change are: (1) how much global warming
and climate change will occur; (2) how bad will it get; (3) when will all this occur; (4)
what should be done about it. This paper attempts to explain why science and economics
cannot resolve these questions to anywhere near the degree of accuracy that we have come
to expect from more traditional applications of cost-benet analysis (CBA), because there
is so much deep structural uncertainty associated with climate change. The unknown
unknowns of climate change make CBA signicantly more fuzzy in this arena than in
more traditional applications  like constructing roads, strengthening bridges, or setting
building codes in earthquake-prone zones. The paper tries to make sense of this anomalous
situation and explores what might be done in terms of actionable alternatives under such
fuzzy circumstances.
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Climate change is so complicated, and it involves so many sides of so many di¤erent
disciplines and viewpoints, that no analytically-tractable model or paper can aspire to il-
luminate more than a few facets of the problem. Because the problem is so complex,
economists typically resort to numerical computer simulations. An Integrated Assessment
Model(hereafter IAM) for climate change is a multi-equation computerized model linking
aggregate economic growth with simple climate dynamics in order to analyze the economic
impacts of global warming. An IAM is essentially a dynamic model of an economy with a
controllable GHG-driven externality of endogenous greenhouse warming. IAMs have proven
themselves useful for understanding several aspects of the economics of climate change es-
pecially in describing outcomes from a complicated interplay of the very long lags and huge
inertias involved.
A key starting point for any CBA of climate change should recognize that future temper-
atures or damages cannot be known exactly and must be expressed as a probability density
function (PDF). Yet, most existing IAMs treat central forecasts of temperatures or dam-
ages as if they were certain and then do some sensitivity analysis on parameter values. In
the rare cases where an IAM formally incorporates uncertainty, it typically uses thin-tailed
PDFs including, especially, truncation of PDFs at arbitrary cuto¤s. (Often this truncation
is more implicit than explicit because a nite discrete-point PDF is used.) What typically
emerges from conventional IAM analysis is the so-called policy rampof gradually tighten-
ing emissions over time. The underlying rationale of the policy ramp is to postpone pain on
climate change prevention, because it is an investment whose payo¤comes only in the distant
future (by human, if not geological, standards). When the distant-future payo¤ times are
considered, the rate of return on GHG mitigation is lower than the rate of return on edu-
cation, health, infrastructure, or a variety of other quicker-yielding public investments. As
will be explained later, policy-ramp gradualism seems quite sensitive to the functional form
of the assumed disutility of high temperature changes, to how the extreme tail probabilities
are specied, and to the rate of pure time preference used to discount future utilities and
disutilities.
Modeling uncertain catastrophes presents some very strong challenges to economic analy-
sis, the full implications of which have not yet been adequately confronted. Cost-benet
analysis based on expected utility (EU) theory has been applied in practice primarily to
cope with uncertainty in the form of a known thin-tailed PDF. I will argue that the PDF
of distant-future temperature changes is fat tailed. A thin-tailed PDF assigns a relatively
much lower probability to rare events in the extreme tails than does a fat-tailed PDF.1 (Even
1As I use the term, a PDF has a fat(or thickor heavy) tail when its moment generating function
(MGF) is innite i.e., the tail probability approaches zero more slowly than exponentially. The standard
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though both limiting probabilities are innitesimal, the ratio of a thick-tailed probability di-
vided by a thin-tailed probability approaches innity in the limit.) Not much thought has
gone into conceptualizing or modeling what happens to EU-based CBA for fat-tailed dis-
asters. A CBA of a situation with known thin tails, even including whatever elements of
subjective arbitrariness it might otherwise contain, can at least in principle make comforting
statements of the generic form: if the PDF tails are cut o¤ here, then EU theory will still
capture and convey an accurate approximation of what is important. Such accuracy-of-
approximation PDF-tail-cuto¤ statements, alas, do not exist in this generic sense for what
in this paper I am calling fat-tailed CBA.
Fat-tailed CBA has strong implications that have neither been recognized in the litera-
ture nor incorporated into formal CBA modeling of disasters like climate-change catastro-
phes. These implications raise many disturbing yet important questions, which will be dealt
with somewhat speculatively in the concluding sections of this paper. Partially answered
questions and speculative thoughts aside, I contend that, at least in principle, fat-tailed
CBA can change conventional thin-tail-based climate change policy advice. This paper
argues that it is quite possible, and even numerically plausible, that the answers to the
big policy question of what to do about climate change can hinge on the issue of how the
high-temperature damages and tail probabilities are conceptualized and modeled. It is true
that some reasonable-looking specications and plausible parameter values can give rise to
a gradualist policy ramp. But I think it is also true that some equally (or even more) rea-
sonable specications and parameter values can give very di¤erent results from a gradualist
policy ramp. By implication, the advice coming out of conventional thin-tailed CBAs of
climate change should be treated with caution until this low-probability high-impact aspect
is addressed seriously and resolved empirically in a true fat-tailed CBA.
This paper explains in non-technical language a connection among the following four
basic ideas: 1) the probability distribution of future global temperature has a fat tail at its
upper extreme; 2) the disutility-damage of high temperatures is sensitive to the functional
form that is assumed; 3) when discounted at an uncertain rate of pure time preference that
might be close to zero, the fat tails and temperature-sensitive disutilities can make expected
present discounted damages very large; 4) because elevated stocks of CO2 have such a long
residence time in the atmosphere, and because it takes so long to learn about irreversible
climate changes and to make midcourse corrections, a signicant increase in expected welfare
example of a fat-tailed PDF is the power law (aka Pareto aka inverted polynomial) distribution, although, for
example, a lognormal PDF is also fat-tailed, as is an inverted-normal or inverted-gamma or Student-t. By
this more or less standard denition, a PDF whose MGF is nite has a thintail i.e., the tail probability
approaches zero more rapidly than exponentially. A normal or a gamma are examples of thin-tailed PDFs,
as is any PDF having nite supports, like a uniform distribution or a discrete-point distribution.
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might be obtained if the upper extremes of the fat tail could be truncated before reaching
catastrophic temperatures.
The nal parts of the paper concern the welfare and policy implications of coupling
fat-tailed uncertainty with high disutility of extreme temperatures. Under any foreseeable
technology, elevated stocks of CO2 are committed to persist for a very long time in the
atmospheric pipeline. And it also takes a long time to learn about looming realizations
of uncertain, but largely irreversible climate changes. Thus, CO2 stock inertia, along with
slow learning, makes it di¢ cult to react to unfolding disasters by throttling back CO2 ow
emissions in time to avert an impending catastrophe. In this kind of situation, which is
akin to trying to turn around an ocean liner in time to get away from a disaster, a large
increase in expected welfare might be gained if some relatively benign form of fast geoengi-
neering were deployable as an emergency last-minute response for knocking down rapidly
the bad fat tail of temperature change. Even if fast geoengineering is not a replacement
for curtailing GHG emissions, because it is too risky to be used as a mainline defence and it
has too many other bad consequences, the logic of this paper argues that it still might play
an important niche role as an emergency-preparedness fallback component in a balanced
portfolio of mixed options for dealing with climate change. The paper highlights the idea
that this aspect (the high expected value in this context of being able to truncate the bad fat
tail quickly) may constitute a respectable economic underpinning supporting a well-funded
research program, undertaken now, to determine the feasibility, environmental side e¤ects,
and cost-e¤ectiveness of fast geoengineering preparedness. The paper concludes that, no
matter what else is done realistically (within the realm of reason) to slow CO2 buildups, eco-
nomic analysis lends some support to undertaking serious research now into the prospects
of fast geoengineering preparednessas a state-contingent emergency option o¤ering at
least the possibility of knocking down catastrophic temperatures rapidly.
2 Deep Structural Uncertainty About Extremes
In this section I try to make the case that standard CBAs or IAMs of climate change likely
sidestep some important issues concerning improbable but extreme outcomes. I try to make
this case by citing three aspects of the climate science that do not seem to be adequately
covered by conventional economic analyses. While di¤erent aspects of structural uncertainty
might additionally be cited, I restrict my case to these three examples, which I will call
Exhibits A, B, and C.
Exhibit A concerns the atmospheric level of greenhouse gases over the last 800,000
years. Ice core drilling in Antarctica began in the late 1970s and is still ongoing. The
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record of carbon dioxide (CO2) and methane (CH4) trapped in tiny ice-core bubbles was
extended in 2008 to 800,000 years.2 It is important to recognize that the numbers in this
unparalleled 800,000-year record of GHG levels are among the very best data that exist in
the science of paleoclimate. Almost all other data (including past temperatures) is inferred
indirectly by proxy variables, whereas this ice-core GHG data is directly observed.
The pre-industrial-revolution level of atmospheric CO2 (about two centuries ago) was
280 parts per million (ppm). The ice-core data show that carbon dioxide was never outside
a range between 180 and 300 ppm during the last 800,000 years, with instances above 280
ppm exceedingly rare (to the point of being almost negligible). Currently, CO2 is at 385
ppm. Methane was never higher than 750 parts per billion (ppb) in 800,000 years, but now
this extremely potent GHG, which is 26 times more powerful than CO2, is at 1,780 ppb.
Carbon-dioxide-equivalent (CO2-e) GHGs are currently at 435 ppm. Even more alarming is
the rate of change of GHGs, with increases in carbon dioxide never exceeding 30 ppm over
any past thousand-year period, while now CO2 has risen by 30 ppm in just the last 17 years.
Thus, anthropomorphic activity has elevated CO2 and CH4 to levels very far outside their
natural range and at a stupendously rapid rate. There is no analogue for anything like
this happening in the past geological record. Therefore, we do not really know with much
condence what will happen next. The link between GHG levels and temperature change in
the ice-core record is not unicausal, and it is not fully understood, but this unsure link just
adds more uncertainty to the picture. Any way one looks at it, GHGs are strongly implicated
in global warming. Just to stabilize atmospheric CO2 levels at twice pre-industrial-revolution
levels would require not just stable but sharply declining emissions within a few decades
from now. Forecasting ahead a century or two, the levels of atmospheric GHGs that may
ultimately be attained (unless drastic measures are undertaken) have likely not existed for
at least tens of millions of years and the rate of change will likely be unique on a time scale
of hundreds of millions of years.
Astonishingly, conventional CBAs and IAMs take almost no direct account of the mag-
nitude of these unprecedented changes in GHGs and the enormous uncertainty they create
for an economic analysis of climate change. Perhaps even more remarkable is the fact that
the gradualist policy rampthat emerges from standard CBAs and IAMs attains optimal
stabilization at levels of CO2 that are about 650-700 ppm within a century or two. This is
my Exhibit A in the case that conventional CBAs and IAMs underplay, or sometimes even
disregard, the tremendous structural uncertainties associated with climate change.
Exhibit Bconcerns the ultimate temperature response to such kind of unprecedented
increases in GHGs.
2See Barnola et al (2008)
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So-called climate sensitivity is a key macro-indicator of the eventual temperature re-
sponse to GHG changes. Let  lnCO2 be sustained relative change in atmospheric carbon
dioxide while T is equilibrium temperature response. Narrowly dened, climate sensitivity
(here denoted S1) converts  lnCO2 into T by the formula T  (S1= ln 2)   lnCO2.
As the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in its IPCC-AR4 (2007) Executive Sum-
mary puts it: The equilibrium climate sensitivity is a measure of the climate system response
to sustained radiative forcing. It is not a projection but is dened as the global average
surface warming following a doubling of carbon dioxide concentrations. It is likely to be in
the range 2 to 4.5C with a best estimate of 3C, and is very unlikely to be less than 1.5C.
Values substantially higher than 4.5C cannot be excluded, but agreement of models with
observations is not as good for those values. Climate sensitivity is not the same as tem-
perature change, but, for the benchmark-serving purposes of the simplistic example I will be
creating, I assume that the shapes of both PDFs are roughly similar after 100-200 years
because a doubling of anthropogenically-injected CO2-equivalent (CO2-e) GHGs relative to
pre-industrial-revolution levels is essentially unavoidable within the next 40-50 years and
will plausibly remain well above 2preindustrial levels for at least 100+ years thereafter.
Other things being equal, higher values of climate sensitivity will produce higher tempera-
tures at a more remote time in the distant future, which begs the question of whether enough
can be learned su¢ ciently rapidly relative to the super-long residence time of atmospheric
CO2 to make meaningful mid-course corrections (and whether there would be su¢ cient
political will to do it in time). To fully address these timing issues requires a more complete
dynamic model (along with assumptions about the dynamics of information and learning),
but I believe the example here is still telling.
In this paper I am mostly concerned with the roughly 15% of those S1 values sub-
stantially higher than 4.5Cwhich cannot be excluded. A grand total of twenty-two
peer-reviewed studies of climate sensitivity published recently in reputable scientic journals
and encompassing a wide variety of methodologies (along with 22 imputed PDFs of S1) lie
indirectly behind the above-quoted IPCC-AR4 (2007) summary statement. These 22 recent
scientic studies cited by IPCC-AR4 are compiled in Table 9.3 and Box 10.2. It might be
argued that these 22 studies are of uneven reliability and their complicatedly-related PDFs
cannot easily be combined, but for the simplistic purposes of this illustrative example I do
not perform any kind of formal Bayesian model-averaging or meta-analysis (or even engage
in informal cherry picking). Without question, a more sophisticated analysis of how to ag-
gregate scientic data from di¤erent sources is required (including a more careful treatment
of many aspects I am neglecting, such as possible multiplicative combining of probabilities
from overlapping studies). Instead, I just naively assume that all 22 studies have equal
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credibility and for my purposes here their PDFs can be simplistically aggregated. The
upper 5% probability level averaged over all 22 climate-sensitivity studies cited in IPCC-
AR4 (2007) is 7C while the median is 6.4C,3 which I take as signifying approximately
that P [S1 > 7C]  5%. Glancing at Table 9.3 and Box 10.2 of IPCC-AR4, it is appar-
ent that the upper tails of these 22 PDFs tend to be su¢ ciently long and fat that one is
allowed from a simplistically-aggregated PDF of these 22 studies the rough approximation
P [S1 > 10
C]  1%. The actual empirical reason why these upper tails are long and fat
dovetails beautifully with the theory of this paper: inductive knowledge is always useful, of
course, but simultaneously it is limited in what it can tell us about extreme events outside
the range of experience in which case one is forced back onto depending more than one
might wish upon the prior PDF, which of necessity is largely subjective and relatively di¤use.
As a recent Science commentary put it: Once the world has warmed by 4C, conditions will
be so di¤erent from anything we can observe today (and still more di¤erent from the last
ice age) that it is inherently hard to say where the warming will stop. However one looks
at it, the long fat tail of climate sensitivity is disturbing. This is Exhibit B in my case that
conventional CBAs and IAMs may not adequately cover the deep structural uncertainties
associated with climate change.
Exhibit Cconcerns possibly disastrous releases over the long run of bad-feedback com-
ponents of the carbon cycle that are currently omitted from most general circulation models
of climate change. The chief worry here is a signicant supplementary component that con-
ceptually should be added on to climate sensitivity S1. This omitted component concerns
the powerful self-amplication potential of greenhouse warming due to heat-induced releases
of sequestered carbon. One example is the huge volume of GHGs currently sequestered in
arctic permafrost and other boggy soils (mostly as methane, a particularly potent GHG).
A yet-more-remote possibility, which in principle should also be included, is heat-induced
releases of the even-vaster o¤shore deposits of CH4 trapped in the form of hydrates (aka
clathrates)  for which there is a decidedly non-zero probability of destabilized methane
seeping into the atmosphere if water temperatures over the continental shelves warm just
slightly. The amount of methane involved is huge, although it is not precisely known.4
3Details of this calculation are available upon request. Eleven of the studies in Table 9.3 overlap with
the studies portrayed in Box 10.2. Four of these overlapping studies conict on the numbers given for the
upper 5% level. For three of these di¤erences I chose the Table 9.3 values on the grounds that all of the
Box 10.2 values had been modied from the original studies to make them have zero probability mass above
10C. (The fact that all PDFs in Box 10.2 have been normalized to zero probability above 10C biases my
upper-5% averages here towards the low side.) With the fourth conict (Gregory et al (2002a)), I substituted
8.2C from Box 10.2 for the 1 in Table 9.3 (which arises only because the method of the study itself does
not impose any meaningful upper-bound constraint). The only other modication was to average the three
reported volcanic-forcing values of Wigley et al (2005a) in Table 9.3 into one upper-5% value of 6.4C.
4IPCC4 contains some discussion of methane releases.
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Most estimates place the carbon content of methane hydrate deposits at about the same
order of magnitude as the sum total of all of traditional fossil fuel deposits that will ever be
extracted and burned by humans. A CH4 outgassing-amplier process could potentially pre-
cipitate (over the very long run, to be sure) a cataclysmic high-positive-feedback warming.
This real physical basis for a catastrophe scenario is my exhibit C in the case that conven-
tional CBAs and IAMs do not adequately cover the structural uncertainties associated with
possible climate-change disasters. Other examples of a real physical basis for a disastrous
outcome could be cited, but this one will do here.
The real physical possibility of endogenous heat-triggered releases at high temperatures of
the enormous amounts of naturally-sequestered GHGs is a good example of indirect carbon-
cycle feedback-forcing e¤ects that I think should be included in the abstract interpretation
of a concept of climate sensitivitythat is relevant for this paper. What matters for the
economics of climate change is the reduced-form relationship between atmospheric stocks
of anthropogenically-injected CO2-e GHGs and temperature change. Instead of S1, which
stands for climate sensitivity narrowly dened, I work throughout the rest of this paper
with S2, which (abusing scientic terminology somewhat here) stands for a more abstract
generalized climate-sensitivity-like multiplier-parameter that includes heat-induced feed-
backs on the forcing from the above-mentioned releases of naturally-sequestered GHGs, in-
creased respiration of soil microbes, climate-stressed forests, and other weakenings of natural
carbon sinks. The transfer from  ln[anthropogenically-injected CO2-e GHGs] to eventual
T is not linear (and is not even a true long-run equilibrium relationship), but for the
purposes of this highly-aggregated example the linear approximation is good enough. This
suggests that a doubling of anthropogenically-injected CO2-e GHGs causes (very approxi-
mately) ultimate temperature change T  S2.
The main point here is that the PDF of S2 has an even-longer even-fatter tail than the
PDF of S1. A recent study by Torn and Harte (2006) can be used to give some very rough
idea of the relationship of the PDF of S2 to the PDF of S1. It is universally accepted that in
the absence of any feedback gain, S1=1.2C. If g1 is the conventional feedback gain parameter
associated with S1, then S1=1.2 / [1-g1], whose inverse is g1=[S1-1.2] /S1. Torn and Harte es-
timated that heat-induced GHG releases add about .067 of gain to the conventional feedback
factor, so that (expressed in my language) S2=1.2 / [1-g2], where g2=g1+.067. (The .067 is
only an estimate in a linearized formula, but it is unclear in which direction higher order terms
would pull the formula and even if this .067-coe¢ cient were considerably lower my point
would remain.) Doing the calculations, P [S1>7C]=5%=P [g1>.828]=P [g2>.895] implies
P [S2>11.5C]=5%. Likewise, P [S1>10C]=1%=P [g1>.88]=P [g2>.947] implies P [S2>22.6C]=1%
and presumably corresponds to a scenario where CH4 and CO2 are outgassed on a large scale
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from degraded permafrost soils, wetlands, and clathrates.5 The e¤ect of heat-induced GHG
releases on the PDF of S2 is extremely nonlinear at the upper end of the PDF of S2 because,
so to speak, fat tails conjoined with fat tails beget yet-fatter tails.
Of course my calculations and the numbers above can be criticized, but (quibbles and
terminology aside) I dont think most climate scientists would say that these calculations
are fundamentally wrong in principle or that there exists a clearly superior method for gen-
erating rough estimates of extreme-impact tail probabilities. Without further ado I just
assume for purposes of this simplistic example that P [S2>10C]5% and P [S2>20C]1%,
implying that anthropogenic doubling of CO2-e eventually causes P [T>10C]5% and
P [T>20C]1%, which I take as my base-case tail estimates in what follows. These small
probabilities of what amounts to huge climate impacts occurring at some indenite time in
the remote future are wildly-uncertain unbelievably-crude ballpark estimates most de-
nitely not based on hard science. But the subject matter of this paper concerns just such
kind of situations and my overly simplistic example in this case does not depend at all on
precise numbers or specications. To the contrary, the major point I am trying to make is
that such numbers and specications must be imprecise and that this is a signicant part
of the climate-change economic-analysis problem, whose strong implications have thus far
largely been ignored.
Stabilizing anthropogenically-injected CO2-e GHG stocks at anything like twice pre-
industrial-revolution levels looks now like an extremely ambitious goal, which would require
sharply declining GHG emissions within a few decades. Given current trends in emissions,
we will attain such a doubling of anthropogenically-injected CO2-e GHG levels around the
middle of this century and will then go far beyond that amount unless drastic measures
are taken starting soon. Projecting current trends in business-as-usual GHG emissions, a
tripling of anthropogenically-injected CO2-e GHG concentrations would be attained relative
to pre-industrial-revolution levels by early in the 22nd century. Countering this e¤ect is the
idea that we just might begin someday to seriously cut back on GHG emissions (especially
if we learn that a high-S2 catastrophe is looming although the extraordinarily long inertial
lags in the commitment pipeline converting CO2 emissions into temperature increases might
severely limit this option). On the other hand, maybe currently-underdeveloped countries
5I am grateful to John Harte for guiding me through these calculations, although he should not be blamed
for how I am interpreting or using the numbers in what follows. The Torn and Harte study is based upon
an examination of the 420,000-year record from Antarctic ice cores of temperatures along with associated
levels of CO2 and CH4. While based on di¤erent data and a di¤erent methodology, the study of She¤er,
Brovkin, and Cox (2006) supports essentially the same conclusions as Torn and Harte (2006). A completely
independent study from simulating an interactive coupled climate-carbon model of intermediate complexity
in Matthews and Keith (2007) conrms the existence of a strong carbon-cycle feedback e¤ect with especially
powerful temperature amplications at high climate sensitivities.
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like China and India will develop and industrialize at a blistering pace in the future with even
more GHG emissions and even less GHG emissions controls than have thus far been pro-
jected. Or, who knows, we might someday discover a revolutionary new carbon-free energy
source or make a carbon-xing technological breakthrough. Perhaps natural carbon-sink
sequestration processes will turn out to be weaker (or stronger) than we thought. There
is also the unknown role of climate engineering. The recent scientic studies behind my
crude ballpark numbers could turn out to too optimistic or too pessimistic  or I might
simply be misapplying these numbers by inappropriately using values that are either too
high or too low. And so forth and so on. For the purposes of this very crude exam-
ple (aimed at conveying some very rough empirical sense of the fatness of global-warming
tails), I cut through the overwhelming enormity of climate-change uncertainty and the lack
of hard science about tail probabilities by sticking with the overly simplistic story that
P [S2>10C]  P [T>10C]  5% and P [S2>20C]  P [T>20C]  1%. I cant know
precisely what these tail probabilities are, of course, but no one can and that is the point
here. To paraphrase again the overarching theme of this example: the moral of the story
does not depend on the exact numbers or specications in this drastic oversimplication,
and if anything it is enhanced by the fantastic uncertainty of such estimates.
It is di¢ cult to imagine what T  10C-20C might mean for life on earth, but such
high temperatures have not been seen for hundreds of millions of years and such a rate of
change over a few centuries would be unprecedented even on a time scale of billions of years.
Global average warming of 10C-20C masks tremendous local and seasonal variation, which
can be expected to produce temperature increases much greater than this at particular times
in particular places. Because these hypothetical temperature changes would be geologically
instantaneous, they would e¤ectively destroy planet Earth as we know it. At a minimum such
temperatures would trigger mass species extinctions and biosphere ecosystem disintegration
matching or exceeding the immense planetary die-o¤s associated in Earths history with a
handful of previous geo-environmental mega-catastrophes. There exist some truly terrifying
consequences of mean temperature increases 10C-20C, such as: disintegration of the
Greenland and at least the Western part of the Antarctic ice sheets with dramatic raising
of sea level by perhaps 30 meters or so, critically-important changes in ocean heat transport
systems associated with thermohaline circulations, complete disruption of weather, moisture
and precipitation patterns at every planetary scale, highly consequential geographic changes
in freshwater availability, regional desertication and so forth and so on.
All of the above-mentioned horrifying examples of climate-change mega-disasters are in-
controvertibly possible on a time scale of centuries. They were purposely selected to come
across as being especially lurid in order to drive home a valid point. The tiny probabilities of
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nightmare impacts of climate change are all such crude ballpark estimates (and they would
occur so far in the future) that there is a tendency in the literature to dismiss altogether these
highly uncertain forecasts on the scienticgrounds that they are much too speculative to
be taken seriously. In a classical-frequentist mindset, the tiny probabilities of nightmare
catastrophes are so close to zero that they are highly statistically insignicant at any stan-
dard condence level and ones rst impulse can understandably be to just ignore them or
wait for them to become more precise. My main theme contrasts sharply with the con-
ventional wisdom of not taking seriously extreme-temperature-change probabilities because
such probability estimates arent based on hard science and are statistically insignicant.
The exact opposite logic holds because there is a Bayesian sense in which, other things being
equal, the more speculative and fuzzy are the tiny subjective tail probabilities of extreme
events, the less ignorable and the more serious is the impact on present discounted expected
utility for a risk-averse agent.
When fed into an economic analysis, the great open-ended uncertainty about eventual
mean planetary temperature change cascades into yet-much-greater yet-much-more-open-
ended uncertainty about eventual changes in welfare. There exists here a very long chain
of tenuous inferences fraught with huge uncertainties in every link beginning with unknown
base-case GHG emissions; then compounded by huge uncertainties about how available poli-
cies and policy levers will transfer into actual GHG emissions; compounded by huge uncer-
tainties about how GHG-ow emissions accumulate via the carbon cycle into GHG-stock
concentrations; compounded by huge uncertainties about how and when GHG-stock concen-
trations translate into global mean temperature changes; compounded by huge uncertainties
about how global mean temperature changes decompose into regional temperature and cli-
mate changes; compounded by huge uncertainties about how adaptations to, and mitigations
of, climate-change damages are translated into utility changes especially at a regional level;
compounded by huge uncertainties about how future regional utility changes are aggregated
 and then how they are discounted  to convert everything into expected-present-value
global welfare changes. The result of this immense cascading of huge uncertainties is a re-
duced form of truly stupendous uncertainty about the aggregate expected-present-discounted
utility impacts of catastrophic climate change, which mathematically is represented by a
very-spread-out very-fat-tailed PDF of what might be called welfare sensitivity.
Even if a generalized climate-sensitivity-like scaling parameter such as S2 could be bounded
above by some big number, the value of welfare sensitivityis e¤ectively bounded only by
some very big number representing something like the value of statistical civilization as we
know it or maybe even the value of statistical life on earth as we know it. This is the
essential point of this simplistic motivating example. Suppose it were granted for the sake
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of argument that an abstract climate-sensitivity-like scaling parameter such as S2 might
somehow be constrained at the upper end by some fundamental law of physics that assigns a
probability of exactly zero to temperature change being above some critical physical constant
instead of continuously higher temperatures occurring with continuously lower probabilities
trailing o¤ asymptotically to zero. Even granted such an upper bound on S2, the essential
point here is that the enormous unsureness about (and enormous sensitivity of CBA to) an
arbitrarily-imposed damages function for high temperature changes makes the relevant
reduced-form criterion of welfare sensitivity to a fat-tailed generalized scaling parameter
seem almost unbelievably uncertain at high temperatures to the point of being essentially
unbounded for practical purposes. This is my Exhibit C.
3 Fat Tails, High-Temp Disutilities, and Discounting
Because the integral of a PDF is one, the PDF of catastrophic temperatures must decline to
an asymptote of zero probability. Thus, extreme outcomes can happen, but their likelihood
diminishes to zero as a function of how extreme is the output. The fact that extreme
outcomes cannot be eliminated altogether, but are theoretically possible with some positive
probability, is not unique to climate change. What is worrisome is not the fact that extreme
tails are long per se (reecting the fact that a meaningful upper bound does not exist),
but that they are fat (with probability density). The critical question is how fast does
the probability of a catastrophe decline relative to the scope and impact of the catastrophe.
Other things being equal, a thin-tailed PDF is of less concern because the probability of the
bad event declines exponentially (or faster). A fat-tailed distribution, where the probability
declines polynomially in the temperature, can be much more worrisome.
A variety of mechanisms will produce a fat-tailed distribution of long-run temperature
changes. One mechanism concerns the fact that climate sensitivity is of the form S =
1=(1  g) where g < 1 is a feedback-gain coe¢ cient. If the PDF of g allows values near one,
even though with very low probability, then the PDF of S tends to be long and fat-tailed.6
Another mechanism for generating fat tails is structural uncertainty.7 The basic idea
behind this mechanism can be illustrated by a specic example. Oversimplifying enor-
mously, how warm the climate ultimately gets is approximately a product of two factors 
anthropogenically-injected CO2-e GHGs and a critical climate-sensitivity-like scaling multi-
plier. Both factors are uncertain, but the scaling parameter is more open-ended on the high
side with a longer and fatter upper tail. This critical scale parameter reecting huge scien-
6This idea is developed in an inuential article by Roe and Baker (2007).
7This idea is developed extensively in Weitzman (2009).
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tic uncertainty is then used as a multiplier for converting aggregated GHG emissions an
input mostly reecting economic uncertainty into eventual temperature changes. Suppose
the true value of this scaling parameter is unknown because of limited past experience, a
situation that can be modeled as if inferences must be made inductively from a nite num-
ber of data observations. At a su¢ ciently high level of abstraction, each data point might
be interpreted as representing an outcome from a particular scientic or economic study.
Having an uncertain scale parameter in such a setup can add a signicant tail-fattening ef-
fect to posterior-predictive PDFs, even when Bayesian learning takes place with arbitrarily
large (but nite) amounts of data. Loosely speaking, the driving mechanism here is that
the operation of taking expectations of expectationsor probability distributions of prob-
ability distributions spreads apart and fattens the tails of the reduced-form compounded
posterior-predictive PDF. It is inherently di¢ cult to learn from nite samples alone enough
about the probabilities of extreme events to thin down the bad tail of the PDF because, by
denition, we dont get many data-point observations of such catastrophes. This mecha-
nism provides some kind of a generic argument why fat tails are almost inherent in many
situations.
Although the basic idea is more general, it can be illustrated concretely by the relationship
between the normal distribution and the Student-t. A normal distribution is thin tailed
because the tail probabilities in the PDF decline faster than exponentially. If we do not know
the parameters of the normal distribution (the mean and, more importantly, the standard
deviation), but we have n observations drawn from the normal distribution, the implied
posterior-predictive distribution is Student-t with n degrees of freedom. A Student-t PDF
with n degrees of freedom is thick tailed because it is readily conrmed that the tails are
polynomial of order n.
A Student-t childposterior-predictive PDF from a large number of observations looks
almost exactly like its bell-shaped normal parentexcept that the probabilities are some-
what more stretched out, making the tails appear relatively fatter at the expense of a slightly-
atter center. In the limit, the ratio of the fat Student-t tail probability divided by the thin
normal tail probability approaches innity, even while both tail probabilities are approaching
zero. Intuitively, a normal density becomesa Student-t from a tail-fattening spreading-
apart of probabilities caused by the variance of the normal having itself a (inverted gamma)
probability distribution. It is then no surprise that people are more averse qualitatively
to a relatively fat-tailed Student-t posterior-predictive child distribution than they are to
the relatively thin-tailed normal parent which begets it. Perhaps more surprising is the
quantitative strength of this endogenously-derived aversion to the e¤ects of unknown tail-
structure. The story behind this quantitative strength is that fattened posterior-predictive
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bad tails represent structural or deep uncertainty about the possibility of rare high-impact
disasters that using colorful language here scareany agent having a utility function
with relative risk aversion everywhere bounded above zero.
Uncertain structural parameters (coupled with nite data, under conditions of everywhere-
positive relative risk aversion) can have strong consequences for CBA when catastrophes are
theoretically possible, because in such circumstances it can drive CBA much more than any-
thing else, including discounting. When fat-tailed temperature PDFs are combined with
a utility function that is sensitive to high temperatures, it can make quite a di¤erence on
the outcomes of CBA. To see why the functional form of damages from high temperatures
can be critical in this context, even when limited to a quadratic expression, consider the
following formulation. Let U(C;A) stand for utility as a function of consumption C and
environmental amenities A. Let A(T ) stand for environmental amenities as a function of
temperature change. Suppose in what follows the base case
A(T ) =
1
1 + (T )2
(1)
for some positive constant .
All existing IAMs treat high-temperature damages by a rather casual extrapolation of
whatever specication is (typically arbitrarily) assumed to be the low-temperature damages
function. High-temperature damages extrapolated from a low-temperature damages func-
tion seem to be remarkably sensitive to assumed functional forms and parameter choices.
Almost any function can be made to t the low-temperature damages assumed by the mod-
eler, even though these functions can give enormously di¤erent values at higher tempera-
tures. Most IAM damages functions reduce welfare-equivalent consumption by a quadratic-
polynomial multiplier equivalent to (1), with  calibrated to some postulated loss forT  2-




1   ; (2)
where  is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. The particular (and, in this context,
perhaps peculiar) choice of functional form (1), (2) allows the economy to substitute con-
sumption for high temperatures relatively easily, since the elasticity of substitution between
C and A in this particular formulation is one.
There was never any more compelling rationale for the particular functional form (1),
(2) than the comfort that economists feel from having worked with it before. In other
words, the multiplicative quadratic-polynomial specication is extrapolated to assess climate-
change damages at high temperatures for no better reason than casual familiarity with this
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particular form from other cost-of-adjustment dynamic economic models, where it has been
used primarily for analytical simplicity in a situation that, at best, approximates reality for
small changes. I would argue that if, for some unclear reason, climate-change economists
want dependence of damages to be a multiplicative function of (T )2 of form (2), then
a far better function at high temperatures for a consumption-reducing welfare-equivalent
quadratic-based multiplier is the exponential form A(T ) = exp( (T )2). Why? Look
at the specication choice abstractly.
With isoelastic utility, the exponential specication is equivalent to dU=U _ dA, while the
polynomial specication is equivalent to dU=U _ dA=A. For me it is obvious that, between
the two, the former is much superior to the latter. When temperatures are already high
in the latter case, why should the impact of dA on dU=U be articially and unaccountably
diluted via dividing dA by high values of A? The same argument applies to any polynomial
in T . I cannot prove that my favored choice is the more reasonable of the two functional
forms for high T (although I truly believe that it is), but no one can disprove it either 
and this is the point here.
The value of  required for calibrating welfare-equivalent consumption at T 2-3C to
be (say) 97-98% of consumption at T = 0C is so miniscule that both the polynomial-
quadratic multiplier 1=[1+(T )2] and the exponential-quadratic multiplier exp( (T )2)
give virtually identical outcomes for relatively small values of T , but at ever higher tem-
peratures they gradually, yet ever increasingly, diverge. With a fat-tailed PDF of T , there
can be a big di¤erence between these two functional forms in the implied willingness to pay
(WTP) to avoid or reduce uncertainty in T . When the consumption-reducing welfare-
equivalent damages multiplier has the exponential form exp( (T )2), then with fat tails
the WTP to avoid (or even reduce) fat-tailed uncertainty can be a very large fraction of
consumption.
In a recent article, Sterner and Persson (2008) tested on a leading IAM a utility function













where b and  are positive constants, with  being the the (constant) elasticity of substitution
between C and A. The particular multiplicative form (2) is a special case (for  = 1) of
the more general CES form (3). Sterner and Persson chose as elasticity of substitution
what they argue is a more appropriate (than  = 1) value of  = 1
2
, and show that this
change can make a big di¤erence on the economic policy recommended by an IAM. When
 = 1
2
, the policy-ramp tightening of GHG emissions is much stronger and steeper than for
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the conventional IAM case  = 1.
When  = 1
2
and  = 2, which are the numerical values chosen by Sterner and Persson








Exactly the same policy implications that are shown by Sterner and Persson would come
out of the simpler specication of additively-separable utility of the form
U =
C1 
1     (T )
2 (5)
for the plausible coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion value  = 2. Form (5) is a standard
isoelastic utility of consumption minus a conventional quadratic loss function in tempera-
ture changes. Because (4) and (5) are identical (except for a multiplicative constant), the
numerical experiment of Sterner and Persson can be interpreted as showing that there is a
big di¤erence in policy implications between the standard (in the literature) multiplicative
form (2) and the less standard (but no less familiar) additive form (5). In an optimal
policy, the additive form (5) induces a much more stringent curtailment of GHG emissions
than the multiplicative form (2). This demonstrates clearly how seemingly minor changes
in the specication of high-temperature damages (here from multiplicative to additive) can
dramatically change the climate-change policies recommended by an IAM. Such fragility of
policy to forms of disutility functions might be considered a fourth exhibit Exhibit D
if you will in making the case that conventional CBAs and IAMs do not adequately cope
with structural uncertainty here uncertainty about the specication of damages.
There will be a really big impact on making optimal GHG-emissions policy be more
stringent if the discount rate used for discounting future climate-change disutilities is small
(combined with fat tails of high temperatures and a disutility function that is sensitive to
high-temperature damages). It is critical to bear in mind that the number being discussed
here for discounting is the so-called rate of pure time preferenceor utility discount rate,
which is a subjective taste-like parameter that is di¢ cult to pin down. It is much harder
to argue that this utility discount rate should not be almost zero than it is to make such an
argument for the so-called goods interest rate,which is far more directly tied to observed
market rates of return on capital that are unquestionably signicantly positive. (Any
goods interest rate can be made compatible with a zero rate of pure time preference just by
adjusting the elasticity of marginal utility appropriately.8) If a near-zero rate of pure time
8This is explained, e.g., in Dasgupta (2007).
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preference is used to discount disutilities of temperature damages, the optimal policy may
curtail GHG emissions very severely in formulation (5) (or (4)). Even when the rate of pure
time preference is positive, but it is not known, there can still be a big impact if there is a
possibility of the rate of time preference being near zero. When this utility discount rate
itself has a PDF with non-negligible probability density in a neighborhood of zero, then the
expected present discounted disutility (from additive quadratic temperature damages) can
be very large. In order to avoid such a probability-weighted bad possibility, the optimal
policy will curtail GHG emissions, typically severely.
Reasonable attempts to constrict the length or the fatness of the badtail (or to mod-
ify the utility function) can still leave us with uncomfortably big numbers whose exact
value depends non-robustly upon articial constraints or parameters that we really do not
understand. The only legitimate way to avoid this potential problem is when there ex-
ists strong a priori knowledge that restrains the extent of total damages. If a particular
type of idiosyncratic uncertainty a¤ects only one small part of an individuals or a soci-
etys overall portfolio of assets, exposure is naturally limited to that specic component and
bad-tail fatness is not such a paramount concern. However, some very few but very impor-
tant real-world situations have potentially unlimited exposure due to structural uncertainty
about their potentially open-ended catastrophic reach. Climate change potentially a¤ects
the whole worldwide portfolio of utility by threatening to drive all of planetary welfare to
disastrously low levels in the most extreme scenarios.
The part of the distribution of possible future outcomes that can most readily be learned
(from inductive information of a form as if conveyed by data) concerns the relatively more
likely outcomes in the middle of the distribution. From previous experience, past observa-
tions, plausible interpolations or extrapolations, and the law of large numbers, there may be
at least some modicum of condence in being able to construct a reasonable picture of the
central regions of the posterior-predictive PDF. As we move towards probabilities in the pe-
riphery of the distribution, however, we are increasingly moving into the unknown territory of
subjective uncertainty where our probability estimate of the probability distributions them-
selves becomes increasingly di¤use because the frequencies of rare events in the tails cannot
be pinned down by previous experiences or past observations. It is not possible to learn
enough about the frequency of extreme tail events from nite samples alone to make the out-
come of a CBA independent of articially-imposed bounds on the extent of possibly-ruinous
disasters. Climate-change economics generally and the fatness of climate-sensitivity tails
specically are prototype examples of this principle, because we are trying to extrapolate
inductive knowledge far outside the range of limited past experience.
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4 Some Implications of Fat-Tailed Logic
By fat-tailed logicI mean a combination of fat tails and temperature-sensitive disutilities,
along with low rates of pure time preference. A common reaction to the conundrum for
CBA implied by fat-tailed logic is to acknowledge its mathematical foundation but to wonder
how it is to be used constructively for deciding what to do in practice. Is this fat-tailed
logic an economics version of an impossibility theorem which signies that there are fat-tailed
situations where economic analysis is up against a strong constraint on the ability of any
quantitative analysis to inform us without committing to an empirical CBA framework that
is based upon some explicit numerical estimates of the miniscule probabilities of all levels of
catastrophic impacts down to absolute disaster? Even if it were true that this logic represents
a valid economic-statistical precautionary-like principle which, at least theoretically, might
dominate decision making, would not putting into practice this generalized precautionary
principlefreeze all progress if taken too literally? Considering the enormous inertias that
are involved in the buildup of GHGs, and the warming consequences, is the possibility of
learning and mid-course corrections a plausible counterweight to this fat-tailed logic, or, at
the opposite extreme, has the commitment of GHG stocks in the ultra-long pipeline already
fattened the bad tail so much that it doesnt make much di¤erence what is done in the
near future about GHG emissions? How should the bad fat tail of climate uncertainty
be compared with the bad fat tails of various proposed solutions such as nuclear power,
geoengineering, or carbon sequestration in the ocean oor? Other things being equal, this
fat-tailed logic suggests as a policy response to climate change a relatively more cautious
approach to GHG emissions, but how much more caution is warranted?
I simply dont know the full answers to the extraordinarily wide range of legitimate
questions that fat-tailed logic raises. I dont think anyone does. But I also dont think that
such questions can be allowed in good conscience to be simply shunted aside by arguing,
in e¤ect, that when probabilities are small and imprecise, then they should be set precisely
to zero. To the extent that uncertainty is formally considered at all in the economics of
climate change, the articial practice of using thin-tailed PDFs especially the usual practice
of imposing de minimis low-probability-threshold cuto¤s that casually dictate what part of
the high-impact bad tail is to be truncated and discarded from CBA seems arbitrary and
problematic.9 In the spirit that the unsettling questions raised by fat-tailed CBA for the
economics of climate change must be addressed seriously, even while admitting that we dont
know all of the answers, I o¤er here some speculative thoughts on what it all means. Even if
9Adler (2007) sketches out in some detail the many ways in which de minimis low-probability-threshold
cuto¤s are arbitrary and problematic in more-ordinary regulatory settings.
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the quantitative magnitude of what fat-tailed logic implies for climate-change policy seems
somewhat hazy, the qualitative direction of the policy advice is nevertheless quite clear.
In ordinary run-of-the-mill limited exposure or thin-tailed situations, there is at least
the underlying theoretical reassurance that nite-cuto¤-based CBA might (at least in prin-
ciple) be an arbitrarily-close approximation to something that is accurate and objective. In
fat-tailed unlimited-exposure situations, by contrast, there is no such theoretical assurance
underpinning the arbitrary cuto¤s and CBA outcomes are not robust to fragile assumptions
about the likelihood of extreme impacts and how much disutility they cause.
One does not want to abandon lightly the ideal that CBA should bring independent em-
pirical discipline to any application by being based upon empirically-reasonable parameter
values. Even when fat-tailed logic applies, CBA based upon empirically-reasonable func-
tional forms and parameter values might reveal useful information. Simultaneously one does
not want to be obtuse by insisting that the catastrophe logic behind fat tails makes no prac-
tical di¤erence for CBA because the parameters just need to be determined empirically and
then simply plugged into the analysis along with some extrapolative guesses about the form
of the damages function for high-temperature catastrophes (combined with speculative
extreme-tail probabilities). So some sort of a tricky balance is required between being over-
awed by fat-tailed catastrophe logic into abandoning CBA altogether and being underawed
into insisting that it is just another empirical issue to be sorted out by business-as-usual
CBA. By all means plug in tail probabilities, disutilities of high impacts, rates of pure time
preference, and so forth, and then see what emerges empirically but do not be surprised
when CBA outcomes are very sensitive to specications and parameter values.
The degree to which the kind of generalized precautionary principle that comes out
of fat-tailed reasoning is relevant for a particular application must be decided on a case-
by-case rule of reasonbasis. In the particular application to the economics of climate
change, with so obviously limited data and limited experience about the catastrophic reach
of climate extremes, to ignore or suppress the signicance of rare fat-tailed disasters is to
ignore or suppress what economic-statistical decision theory seems to be telling us here is
potentially the most important part of the analysis.
Where does global warming stand in the portfolio of extreme risks currently facing us?
There exist maybe half a dozen or so serious nightmare scenariosof environmental disasters
perhaps comparable in conceivable worst-case impact to catastrophic climate change. These
might include: biotechnology, nanotechnology, asteroids, strangelets, pandemics, runaway
computer systems, nuclear proliferation.10 It may well be that each of these possibilities of
environmental catastrophe deserves its own CBA application of fat-tailed logic along with
10Many of these are discussed in Posner (2004), Sunstein (2007), and Parson (2007).
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its own empirical assessment of how much probability measure is in the extreme tails. Even
if this were true, however, it would not lessen the need to reckon with the strong potential
implications of fat-tailed logic for CBA in the particular case of climate change.
Perhaps it is little more than raw intuition, but for what it is worth I do not feel that
the handful of other conceivable environmental catastrophes are nearly as critical as climate
change. I illustrate with two specic examples. The rst is widespread cultivation of
crops based on genetically-modied organisms (GMOs). At casual glance, climate-change
catastrophes and bioengineering disasters might look similar. In both cases, there is deep
unease about articial tinkering with the natural environment, which can generate fright-
ening tales of a planet ruined by human hubris. Suppose for specicity that with GMOs
the overarching fear of disaster is that widespread cultivation of so-called Frankenfood
might somehow allow bioengineered genes to escape into the wild and wreak havoc on del-
icate ecosystems and native populations (including, perhaps, humans), which have been
ne-tuned by millions of years of natural selection. At the end of the day I think that
the potential for environmental disaster with Frankenfood is much less than the potential
for environmental disaster with climate change along the lines of the following loose and
oversimplied reasoning.
In the case of Frankenfoods interfering with wild organisms that have evolved by nat-
ural selection, there is at least some basic underlying principle that plausibly dampens
catastrophic jumping of articial DNA from cultivars to landraces. After all, nature herself
has already tried endless combinations of mutated DNA and genes over countless millions
of years, and what has evolved in the erce battle for survival is only an innitesimal sub-
set of the very ttest permutations. In this regard there exists at least some inkling of a
prior argument making it fundamentally implausible that Frankenfood articially selected
for traits that humans nd desirable will compete with or genetically alter the wild types
that nature has selected via Darwinian survival of the ttest. Wild types have already
experienced innumerable small-step genetic mutations, which are perhaps comparable to
large-step human-induced articial modications and which have not demonstrated survival
value in the wild. Analogous arguments may also apply for invasive superweeds,which so
far represent a minor cultivation problem lacking ability to displace either landraces or culti-
vars. Besides all this, safeguards in the form of so-called terminator genescan be inserted
into the DNA of GMOs, which directly prevent GMO genes from reproducing themselves.
A second possibly-relevant example of comparing climate change with another potential
catastrophe concerns the possibility of a large asteroid hitting Earth. In the asteroid case it
seems plausible to presume there is much more inductive knowledge (from knowing something
about asteroid orbits and past collision frequencies) pinning down the probabilities to very
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small almost knownvalues. If we use P [T > 20C]  1% as the very rough probability
of a climate-change cataclysm occurring within the next two centuries, then this is roughly
ten thousand times larger than the probability of a large asteroid impact (of a one-in-a-
hundred-million-years size) occurring within the same time period.
Contrast the above discussion about plausible magnitudes or probabilities of disaster for
genetic engineering or asteroid collisions with possibly-catastrophic climate change. The
climate-change experiment,whose eventual outcome we are trying to infer now, tests
the planets response to a geologically-instantaneous exogenous injection of GHGs. An
exogenous injection of this much GHGs this fast seems unprecedented in Earths history
stretching back perhaps billions of years. Can anyone honestly say now, from very limited
prior information and very limited empirical experience, what are reasonable upper bounds
on the eventual global warming or climate change that we are currently trying to infer will
be the outcome of such a rst-ever planetary experiment? What we do know about cli-
mate science and extreme tail probabilities is that the rate of change of GHGs seems almost
unprecedented in geological history, planet Earth hovers in an unstable trigger-prone whip-
saw ocean-atmosphere system11, chaotic dynamic responses to geologically-instantaneous
GHG shocks are possible, and all twenty-two recently published studies of climate sensitiv-
ity cited by IPCC-AR4 (2007), when mechanically aggregated together, estimate on average
that P [S1 >7C]  5%. To my mind this open-ended aspect with a way-too-high subjec-
tive probability of a catastrophe makes GHG-induced global climate change vastly more
worrisome than cultivating Frankenfood or colliding with large asteroids.
These two examples hint at making a few meaningful distinctions among the handful
of situations where fat-tailed logic might reasonably apply. My discussion here is hardly
conclusive, so we cannot rule out a biotech or asteroid disaster. However, I would say
on the basis of this line of argument that such disasters seem very very unlikely, whereas a
climate disaster seems onlyvery unlikely. In the language of this paper, synthetic biology
or large asteroids feel more like high-knowledge situations that we know a lot more about
relative to climate change, which by comparison feels more like a low-knowledge situation
about which we know relatively little. Whether my argument here is convincing or not, the
overarching principle is this: the mere fact that my logic might also apply to a few other
environmental catastrophes does not constitute a valid reason for excluding it from applying
to climate change.
The simplistic story I am telling here represses the real-option value of waiting and
learning. Concerning this aspect, however, with climate change we are on the four horns
of two dilemmas. The horns of the rst dilemma are the twin facts that built-up stocks
11On the nature of this unstable whipsawclimate equilibrium, see Hansen et al (2007).
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of GHGs might end up ex post representing a hugely-expensive irreversible accumulation,
but so too might massive investments in non-carbon technologies that are at least partly
unnecessary.
The second dilemma is the following. Because climate-change catastrophes develop
slower than some other potential catastrophes, there is ostensibly somewhat more chance
for learning and mid-course corrections with global warming relative to, say, biotechnology
(but not necessarily relative to asteroids when a good tracking system is in place). The
possibility of learning by doingmay well be a more distinctive feature of global-warming
disasters than some other disasters, and in that sense deserves to be part of an optimal
climate-change policy. The other horn of this second dilemma, however, is the nasty fact
that the ultimate climate response to GHGs has tremendous inertial pipeline-commitment
lags of several centuries up to millennia (via the very long atmospheric residence time of
CO2). When all is said and done, I dont think there is a smoking gun in the biotechnology,
asteroid, or any other catastrophe scenario quite like the idea that a crude amalgamation
of numbers from the most recent peer-reviewed published scientic articles is suggesting
something like P [S2>10C]5% and P [S2>20C]1%.
The logic of catastrophic climate change seems to be suggesting here that the debate
about what interest rate to use for discounting goods and services, which has dominated the
discussion so far, may be secondary to a debate about the open-ended catastrophic reach
of climate disasters. While it is always fair game to challenge the assumptions of a model,
when theory provides a generic result (like free trade is Pareto optimalor steady growth
eventually outstrips one-time change) the burden of proof is commonly taken as being
upon whoever wants to over-rule the theorem in a particular application. The burden
of proof in climate-change CBA might be upon whomever calculates expected discounted
utilities and disutilities without considering that structural uncertainty might matter more
than discounting or pure objective risk.
5 Possible Implications for Climate-Change Policy
Instead of the existing IAM emphasis on estimating or simulating economic impacts of the
more plausible climate-change scenarios, to at least compensate partially for nite-sample
bias the model of this paper calls for a dramatic oversampling of those stratied climate-
change scenarios associated with the most adverse imaginable economic impacts in the bad
fat tail. With limited sampling resources for the big IAMs, Monte Carlo analysis could
be used much more creatively not necessarily to defend a specic policy result, but to
experiment seriously in order to nd out more about what happens with fat-tailed uncertainty
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and signicant high-temperature damages in the limit as the grid size and number of runs
increase simultaneously. Of course an emphasis on sampling climate-change scenarios in
proportion to utility-weighted probabilities of occurrence forces us to estimate subjective
probabilities down to extraordinarily tiny levels and also to put degree-of-devastation weights
on disasters with damage impacts up to perhaps being welfare-equivalent to losing 99% (or
possibly even more) of consumption but that is the price we must be willing to pay for
having a genuine economic analysis of potentially-catastrophic climate change.
In situations of potentially unlimited damage exposure like climate change, it might be
appropriate to emphasize a slightly better treatment of the worst-case fat-tail extremes 
and what might be done about them, at what cost relative to rening the calibration of
most-likely outcomes or rehashing point estimates of discount rates (or climate sensitivity).
A clear implication of this paper is that greater research e¤ort is relatively ine¤ectual when
targeted at estimating central tendencies of what we already know relatively well about the
economics of climate change in the more-plausible scenarios. A much more fruitful goal
of research might be to aim at understanding even slightly better the deep uncertainties
concerning the less plausible scenarios located in the bad fat tail. (Alas, the tails are the
very part of a PDF that is most di¢ cult to learn, presenting yet another policy dilemma.) I
also believe that an important complementary research agenda, which stems naturally from
the analysis of this paper, is the crying need to comprehend much better all of the options
for possibly dealing with high-impact climate-change extremes, without trying to pre-censor
any of them as socially unacceptable or politically incorrect.
When analyzing the economics of climate change, perhaps it might be possible to make
back-of-the-envelope comparisons with empirical probabilities and mitigation costs for ex-
treme events in the insurance industry. One might try to compare numbers on, say, a home-
owner buying re insurance (or buying re-protection devices, or a young adult purchasing
life insurance, or others purchasing ood-insurance plans) with cost-benet guesstimates of
the world buying an insurance policy going some way towards mitigating the extreme high-
temperature possibilities. On a U.S. national level, rough comparisons could perhaps be
made with the potentially-huge payo¤s, small probabilities, and signicant costs involved in
countering terrorism, building anti-ballistic missile shields, or neutralizing hostile dictator-
ships possibly harboring weapons of mass destruction. A crude natural metric for calibrating
cost estimates of climate-change environmental-insurance policies might be that the U.S. al-
ready spends approximately 21
2
% of national income on the cost of a clean environment.12
All of this having been said, the bind we nd ourselves in now on climate change starts from
12U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (1990), executive summary projections for 2000, which I updated
and extrapolated to 2007.
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a di¤use prior situation to begin with, and is characterized by extremely slow convergence
of inductive knowledge towards resolving the tail uncertainties  relative to the lags and
irreversibilities from not acting before structure is more fully identied.
The point of all of this is that economic analysis is not completely helpless in the pres-
ence of deep structural uncertainty and potentially unlimited exposure. We can say a few
important things about the relevance of fat-tailed CBA to the economics of climate change.
The analysis is much more frustrating and much more subjective and it looks much less
conclusive because it requires some form of speculation (masquerading as an assessment)
about the extreme bad-fat-tail probabilities and utilities. Compared with the thin-tailed
case, CBA of fat-tailed potential catastrophes is inclined to favor paying a lot more attention
to learning how fat the bad tail might be and if the tail is discovered to be too heavy for
comfort after the learning process is a lot more open to at least considering undertaking se-
rious mitigation measures (including, perhaps, geoengineering in the case of climate change)
to slim it down fast. This paying attention to the feasibility of slimming down overweight
tails is likely to be a perennial theme in the economic analysis of catastrophes. The key
economic questions here are: what is the overall cost of such a tail-slimming weight-loss
program and how much of the bad fat does it remove from the overweight tail?
6 An Analytical Foundation for Fast Geoengineering?
The economists case for a carbon tax is traditionally made without explicit reference to
extreme tail behavior. This argument is presumably strengthened when extreme tail events
are considered. Whatever value it happens to be, the uncomfortably big number for
expected disutility that tends to emerge from fat-tailed logic can be reduced by imposing
carbon taxes. So the very rst thing to say here is that the fat upper tail of the PDF
of possible temperature changes lends even greater urgency to reducing GHG emissions by
levying a substantial tax on the burning of fossil fuels. Having said this, there is more to say.
The fat tails introduce some distinctive issues of their own. Responsible economic analysis of
fat tails implies some tolerance for at least considering extreme-sounding proposals that are
not normally placed on the policy table for discussion. One consequence of fat-tailed logic
might concern the role of fast-acting planetary geoengineering. The opinion that follows
might be construed as editorializing, but it seems to me that the analysis of this paper
leads logically to a narrowly-dened niche role for a reliable backstop technology that can
e¤ectively knock down high planetary temperatures quickly in case of emergency.
What I mean by fast geoengineering is any action having the possibility to lower
global temperatures quickly within decades or even years. Practically, at this time fast
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geoengineering means albedo enhancement by injecting sunlight-reective particulates or
aerosols, such as sulfur dioxide precursors, into the stratosphere. I do not touch upon the
science of fast geoengineering, and even tread lightly upon the economics.13 My main focus
here is on the narrow question of whether the analytical argument of this paper supports a
special niche role for fast geoengineering as one important option in balanced portfolio of
global warming strategies and responses. I think the answer is a qualied yes.
The analysis of this paper is suggesting that a signicant component of the overall ex-
pected damages of climate change may be located in the fat upper tail of the temperature
distribution. Cut out the fat upper tail, and you have cut out a major part of the expected
disutility of global warming, goes the argument. According to this logic, a large increase in
expected welfare might be gained if some relatively benign form of fast geoengineering were
deployed in readiness to rapidly derail severe greenhouse heating should this contingency
materialize. Because of the largely-irreversible long pipeline commitment of atmospheric
CO2, this argument might hold even though higher temperatures tend to materialize later
and the emergencymight unfold over a time scale of centuries.
Fast geoengineering seems quite risky, if for no other reason than the law of unintended
consequences, and it cannot ward o¤ all the bad e¤ects of high atmospheric CO2, such as
ocean acidication. However, to say that fast geoengineering does not now look like a
panacea for all the e¤ects of climate and atmosphere changes should not be to prejudge
now that it may not have a very important, perhaps even crucial, future role to play in a
balanced portfolio of responsible climate-change policies. Even if fast geoengineering (Plan
B) is not a replacement for curtailing GHG emissions (Plan A) because it is too risky
to be used as a mainline defence  it might still be critical to have a Plan-B option in
reserve. The analysis of this paper formalizes a possibly large potential welfare gain from
having the capability to slim down quickly a bad fat global-warming tail during a worst-
case emergency. In my opinion, this appears to be a legitimate argument for a well-funded
Plan-B research program, undertaken now, which might include pilot studies and small-scale
eld testing. The purpose would be to determine the feasibility, environmental side e¤ects,
and cost-e¤ectiveness of responsible geoengineering preparedness whose intended use is as
a state-contingent option giving the ability to respond rapidly to a bad future realization of
global-warming uncertainty.
A huge issue with fast geoengineering is that, as an externality, it has diametrically oppo-
site cost properties from curtailing emissions of GHGs. For me, the two really inconvenient
truths about climate change are: 1) CO2 abatement is really costly; (2) fast geoengineering
13Some of the science is reviewed in Rasch et al (2008). The idea of fast geoengineering has been around
for a long time, but was recently given much visibility by the inuential article of Crutzen (2006).
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is really cheap. Like it or not, whether it is a panacea or not, whether it lulls the public
into a false sense of security that undermines legitimate Plan-A GHG-curtailment strate-
gies or not, the incredible economics of geoengineering is simply not ignorable.14 The fast
geoengineering option currently looks so unbelievably inexpensive as a quick x for extreme
temperature changes that virtually any middle-power developed country might be tempted
to implement it unilaterally. For me this means that as well as there being a strong policy
argument that now is the time to learn a lot more about fast geoengineering there is an
additional strong policy argument that now is also the time to start thinking seriously about
an international framework governing the use of this scary option.
7 Conclusion
Heroic attempts at constructive suggestions notwithstanding, it is painfully apparent that
fat-tailed logic makes economic analysis trickier and more open-ended in the presence of deep
structural uncertainty. The economics of fat-tailed catastrophes raises di¢ cult conceptual
issues which cause the analysis to appear less scientically conclusive and to look more
contentiously subjective than what comes out of an empirical CBA of more usual thin-tailed
situations. But if this is the way things are with fat tails, then this is the way things are,
and it is an inconvenient truth to be lived with rather than a fact to be evaded just because
it looks less scientically objective in cost-benet applications.
Perhaps in the end the climate-change economist can help most by not presenting a
cost-benet estimate for what is inherently a fat-tailed situation with potentially unlimited
downside exposure as if it is accurate and objective and perhaps not even presenting the
analysis as if it is an approximation to something that is accurate and objective but instead
by stressing somewhat more openly the fact that such an estimate might conceivably be arbi-
trarily inaccurate depending upon what is subjectively assumed about the high-temperature
damages function along with assumptions about the fatness of the tails and/or where they
have been cut o¤. Even just acknowledging more openly the incredible magnitude of the
deep structural uncertainties that are involved in climate-change analysis  and explain-
ing better to policy makers that the articial crispness conveyed by conventional IAM-based
CBAs here is especially and unusually misleading compared with more-ordinary non-climate-
change CBA situations might elevate the level of public discourse concerning what to do
about global warming. All of this is naturally unsatisfying, frustrating, and not what econo-
mists are used to doing but in rare situations like climate change, where fat-tailed logic
14Barrett (2008) contains an excellent discussion of some implications of what he has dubbed the incredible
economics of geoengineering.
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applies, we may be deluding ourselves and others with misplaced concreteness if we think
that we are able to deliver anything much more precise than this with even the biggest and
most-detailed climate-change IAMs as currently constructed and deployed.
This paper has presented a basic theoretical principle that holds under temperature-
sensitive disutilities and potentially unlimited exposure. In principle, what might be called
the catastrophe-insurance aspect of such a fat-tailed unlimited-exposure situation, which
can never be fully learned away, can dominate discounting, objective-probability risk, and
consumption smoothing. Even if this principle in and of itself does not provide an easy
answer to questions about how much catastrophe insurance to buy (or even an easy answer
in practical terms to the question of what exactly is catastrophe insurance buying for climate
change or other applications), I believe it still might provide a useful way of framing the
economic analysis of catastrophes.
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